Narrative research in communication: key principles and issues by McDonald, Daniel G.
www.ssoar.info
Narrative research in communication: key
principles and issues
McDonald, Daniel G.
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
McDonald, D. G. (2014). Narrative research in communication: key principles and issues. Review of Communication
Research, 2, 115-132. https://doi.org/10.12840/issn.2255-4165.2014.02.01.005
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Nicht-kommerziell) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC Licence
(Attribution-NonCommercial). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-373428
Narrative Research in Communication:
Key Principles and Issues




Review of Communication Research




Ohio State University, USA
mcdonald.221@osu.edu
•	Narrative has taken a central presence in Communication research.
•	Although few communicaiton scholars make a distinction between narrative and story,  narrative and story need 
to be defined for conceptual and analytical clarity.
•	Stories provide causal linkages between events while narratives have specific structures that affect the involvement 
and attention that is required to develop those linkages.
•	Narration simulates the social world through abstraction, simplification and compression.
•	In situation models, words, actions, ideas, sounds and images are all brought together to enable us to experience a 
narrative for ourselves.
•	It is inevitable that we will adopt the perspective of characters so that we can understand a narrative.
•	However, we maintain our attitudes, stereotypes, prejudices, and knowledge of the world that we have experienced. 
We don’t become the character, but the character is us.
•	Perspective taking is inf luenced by the nature and type of character goals and motivations, as well as our knowledge 
of real-world (physical) constraints on the narrative action, and even some physical aspects of the audience member.
A great deal of recent research on communication has been developed in the general area of narrative or narrative 
effects.  The majority of this work has brought in older communication concepts without reconciling those concepts 
with what has been learned about narrative in other social sciences.  This review covers some of the major points 
from research on narrative to help expand the knowledge base and suggest directions for additional work in the field 
of communication.
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During the past decade, the concept of narrative has 
taken a prime place in a number of areas of communica-
tion research, including studies of entertainment, news, 
political communication, and health communication 
(Landreville & Lamarre, 2011; Lee, Hecht, Miller-Day, 
& Elek, 2011; Kim, Bigman, Leader, Lerman & Cappella, 
2012; Prestin, 2013).  While we continue to build a body 
of work focused on narrative in communication, there 
has been a tendency to build our knowledge from scratch, 
or from prior research in communication, without paying 
significant attention to research in Psychology, Neurosci-
ence, Literature, Narratology and Education that has also 
been focused on narrative.  These other fields have amassed 
a body of knowledge about audience interaction with 
narratives and developed a literature related to narrative 
structure, processing and effects that is directly relevant 
to current issues in communication.  
This article examines the literature from diverse areas 
to develop an overview of what is known about narrative 
processes and effects.  The article will focus on what has 
Content
been learned in other fields and how that knowledge can 
inform our research, fill in gaps, and explain certain 
principles that may be useful in understanding commu-
nication processes as they apply to narratives.  After 
describing that literature, we will focus on the idea that 
some of the gaps in the communication literature can be 
illuminated from what has been shown in other fields, 
and other issues can be studied more fruitfully in a cross-
fertilization of techniques and methods.  We argue that 
such an approach can enrich the knowledge base of mul-
tiple fields of study and enable communication research-
ers to progress more quickly in scientific study of narra-
tives.
Communication and Narrative
 In communication, researchers have tended to 
not worry about a definition of narrative, and typically 
assume that everyone knows what a narrative is.  Appel, 
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2008; Bilandzic and Busselle (2008); Busselle & Bilandzic, 
(2009, 2011); Cole (2010); Glaser, Garsoffky & Schwan 
(2009); Green & Brock (2000); Igartua and Barrios (2012); 
Kim, et al., (2012); Lee, et al., (2011); Moyer-Guse and 
Nabi (2010); Oliver, Dillard, Bae & Tamul (2012); Simons 
& Green (2013); Slater & Rouner (2002); Zwarun & Hall 
(2012)  offer no definition of narrative except to consider 
story and narrative equivalent.   Many of the above works 
focus on such concepts as comprehension, cultivation, 
persuasion, enjoyment, or narrative transportation, and 
these variables are reactions to a narrative (e.g., enjoy-
ment, narrative transportation) or components of narrative 
processing (e.g., comprehension, cultivation, persuasion). 
However, given the large volume of recent communication 
research focused on narrative, our field would do well to 
develop a definition.
Those who distinguish between the two terms are 
likely to consider narrative as the structure of all the 
events in a story, while the story is the sequence, or order, 
in which the events occur.  Whether we use narrative or 
story, though, has implications for what we might expect 
in terms of communication processing and effects.  Indeed, 
much of the work on comprehension of narratives via 
reading assume that comprehension strategies are based 
in problem solving, in which the reader attempts to es-
tablish a chain of causal relationships from the opening 
of the narrative to its conclusion (Albrecht, O’Brien, 
Mason & Myers, 1995; Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985; 
Radvansky & Curiel, 1998).
Traditionally, narrative has been defined as a sequence 
of two temporally ordered clauses.  A change in their 
order will result in a change in the interpretation of the 
sequence.  More recently, others (e.g., Herman, 2009) 
have noted that narratives have a spatiotemporal, rather 
than temporal, order, so any definition needs to include 
both space and time in relation to narrative events. 
Chang’s (2013) study of narrative advertising effects, for 
example, refers to two key features:  chronology and 
causality.  Escalas’ (2006) piece suggests that narratives 
tell stories by including one or more episodes with actors 
engaged in actions to achieve goals. While no definition 
is able to meet the requirements of the many fields in 
which narrative research is conducted, nearly all of them 
involve the following four characteristics: actors, events, 
time and space. The connection between the actors and 
events is through a fourth consideration, that the spatio-
temporal sequencing is causal.
Figure 1, for example, indicates some of the possibili-
ties for a simple story involving three events.  For simplic-
ity, characters, space and time are not shown.  Narrative 
A is a simple story arranged in the order in which events 
took place.  The focus for an audience member will be on 
specific points of the story and how different events relate. 
Narrative B uses the same three events, but opens at the 
ending event, proceeds to the first event, and moves to 
the second event. This second narrative, ostensibly the 
same as in the first example (the same three events oc-
curred), though, is structured differently.  If we mov 
Event3 to the beginning, there are two issues that need 
to be resolved.  The first of these issues is the question of 
relating Event3 to Event1 in some sort of causal relation-
ship.  The second requires the audience member to resolve 
Event3 via Event2. In that sense, much more work is 
involved in comprehending the narrative of narrative B 
than narrative A, while in all cases, the story remains 
essentially the same. The third example, narrative C, 
requires the audience to resolve each event in terms of 
what they are told after the event has transpired.  Again, 
the same story is being told, but this type of story is 
likely to involve different skills in comprehending the 
narrative.
It would appear that Narrative A can be understood 
with lower involvement, attention, and cognitive process-
ing, than would be needed in Narrative B or Narrative C. 
Narrative B includes some of the characteristics of Nar-
rative A (moving from Event1 to Event2), but, for com-
prehension, will also involves a different skill, one that 
allows the audience member to recall the details of Event3 
in enough detail and long enough to enable its resolution 
through Event2. Narrative C involves some of the cogni-
tive abilities of Narrative B, but in a different manner.  In 
this case, each event must be explained by the event that 
directly follows it in the narrative.
For purposes of this review, then, narratives and stories 
are similar in that both require at least one actor and at 
least one event connected through some sort of causal 
spatio-temporal framework. Such a definition may fit 
narrative in interpersonal and mediated formats. A story 
consists of those actors, events, space and time described 
within the temporal sequence of events. The narrative 
presents the actors, events, space and time in the order in 
which they are revealed to the audience. Notions such as 
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activated by presentation of ads set in similar circum-
stances.  Chang found support for the idea that these 
episodic memory models make narratives easier to com-
prehend.  When confronted with a snow scene versus a 
mountain scene as an ad background, participants, who 
were more likely to have experienced mountains than 
snow, had higher comprehension of the ad, even though 
both versions incorporated the same text.
Within the field of communication, the formal features 
of content have been studied much longer than have been 
narratives per se. Formal features are those aspects of the 
narrative that are a part of the narrative itself, such as 
chronological order, fades, dissolves, cross-cutting, etc., 
as well as visual effects, voices, sounds and pacing.  Many 
are used by convention to indicate the passing of time, of 
two events occurring consecutively, or occurring at the 
same point in time.  Formal features may also be used to 
help audience members understand a narrative by direct-
ing attention or providing information (Boiarsky, Long 
& Thayer, 1999; Calvert, Huston, Watkins & Wright, 
1982; Huston, et al., 1981). Research on formal features 
suggests that with children’s commercial television, formal 
features are used to attract attention (e.g., fast cuts, music, 
sound effects), while educational television used formal 
features to enhance comprehension or engage in elaborate 
processing, such as with long zooms, or singing (Calvert, 
et al., 1982).  Bilandzic (2003) has suggested that these 
features also are used as cues to media audiences in decid-
ing which television programs to watch while scanning. 
Bilandzic & Busselle (2008) also suggest that formal fea-
tures enhance emotions and facial expressions in audio-
visual media.
Origins of Narrative
Narrative and story are inherently connected to play. 
Singer (1995) described the role that imaginative play 
holds for children – it is a precursor to daydreaming and 
adult pretending games.  Oatley (2011) has described these 
processes as building blocks enabling children to enter 
story worlds and begin to develop sophisticated mental 
simulations.  Oatley notes that Freud was one of the first 
to suggest that narrative fiction itself derives from child-
hood play.  Freud felt that the writers draw from childhood 
play for their material, and that for many adults play is 
identification may be associated with the story more than 
the narrative. Other concepts, such as transportation, 
persuasion and the construction of meaning may be more 
likely to be associated with the processing of, and reac-
tions to, narrative. Without empirical evidence, we can 
only offer conjecture, but, at minimum, with definitions, 
we can ask these types of questions.  
Narrative Structure and Meaning
Given the definition and illustration provided above, 
we can surmise that narratives have a structure – a spe-
cific sequencing of events, actions, character entrances, 
character exits, and temporospatial locations.  Some re-
search has begun to uncover the effects of these narrative 
structures and their implication for audience involvement, 
understanding, and enjoyment.  Bundgaard and Ostergaard 
(2007), for example, indicate that narrative structure 
describes how certain characters move from one state of 
existence to another. The structure, they note, is a dy-
namic means to organize meaning. Using Hemingway’s 
“A Very Short Story” as an example, they indicate that 
reversing the order of the story changes the story from 
one a hopelessly sordid story to a love story following 
classical narrative traditions.
In the Bundgaard and Ostergaard (2007) work, simply 
reversing the order of events leads to very different con-
clusions. A study by Chang (2013) indicates that when 
we recognize aspects of  narrative structures, such as the 
spatial location, we are able to process narratives more 
efficiently. Chang reasoned that episodic memory models 
(Wyer, Hung & Jian, 2008), can be easily accessed and 
Story: Event
1 g Event2 g Event3
Narrative A: Event






3 f Event2 f Event1
Figure 1. A simple story expressed in three different 
narratives
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to narrative by reaching back to Aristotle’s notion of 
mimesis (world-making) as being a part of learning from 
childhood on. Through mimesis, the child rehearses, 
replays and so learns about the world and how to interact 
within it. As a child matures, the objects become mental 
objects in story worlds.
Simulated Worlds
The worlds described by Aristotle and those who study 
children’s play have only recently been extended to nar-
rative as something akin to complicated simulations.  Mar 
and Oatley (2008) have suggested similarly that narratives 
provide a simulation of the social world, providing the 
impetus for learning rules and behaviors involved in social 
interaction. Narration simulates the social world through 
abstraction, simplification and compression. The simula-
tion becomes a deep experience of social interaction which 
is seen as facilitating communication and our understand-
ing of social information. Bruner (1986) further suggests 
that humans build cognitive structures that represent the 
objects and events in our lives in a process that is similar 
to those structures we build for narrative because both 
have a similar function: to help us better understand the 
world around us.  A number of others have written about 
the importance of narrative and world-making to under-
standing our world, and how our understanding of the 
real world affects our interpretation of narratives (Gerrig, 
1993; Gerrig, Brennan, & Ohaeri, 2001; Graesser, Singer, 
& Trabasso, 1994).  
Graesser, et al. (1994) developed a theory of inferences 
that are made during narrative processing. According to 
their work, audience members abandon the process of 
inference and meaning making if they do not have prop-
er background knowledge.  Gerrig and colleagues (Gerrig, 
1993; Gerrig, et al., 2001) have suggested two important 
inferences we make while reading.  One of these, pro-
jected knowledge, occurs when readers use evidence from 
a narrative to project their own knowledge to the charac-
ters:  we assume the characters will have the knowledge 
we have about the world.  Their second suggestion is called 
projected co-presence and suggests that the audience 
members infer that multiple characters have knowledge 
of the same information; sometimes that knowledge is 
something the audience member him/herself does not 
carried out in day-dreaming as an expression of wishes.
Singer (1995; Singer & Singer, 1990) suggests that 
childhood play aids in development of mastery and con-
fidence in negotiating the world, although he also notes 
that Sutton-Smith’s (1988) description of play as develop-
ing a sense of competition and power may be valid as 
well.  Both theorists have argued that childhood play is 
a training ground for adulthood.  Much of childhood play 
involves the use and reworking of shared narratives – 
groups of children often form a narrative by using what 
they know of historical events or media stories, with dif-
ferent children taking the roles of certain characters 
within the narratives. As Oatley (2011) notes, children 
move easily back and forth between enacting roles in a 
story and developing their own story lines within the same 
activity, even switching between roles as necessary to 
further the story.
Play is where we learn to interact with others, where 
we learn to communicate intentions, where we develop 
and follow rules, and suffer the consequences when we 
break those rules.  We also learn to anticipate others’ 
moves and reactions to our moves.  Oatley (2011) notes 
that many mammals engage in play and suggests that play 
prepares us for potential danger and forges strong social 
bonds. 
Singer (1995) describes childhood play as a method 
that children have for dealing with complexity and nov-
elty.  Play enables them to a) re-experience or reconstruct 
events, interactions or thoughts that evoke the emotions 
of interest, excitement and joy; b) avoid situations that 
evoke anger, fear, sadness or shame/guilt; c) express their 
emotions as fully as possible, and d) help control emo-
tional expression when it is necessary to do so.  Singer 
then suggests that play is really the attempt to deal with 
real world objects and people.
Through play, children match novel stimuli with what 
is already known.  If it is not possible to match with what 
is known, play is used to reshape the people and objects 
to manageable sizes so that they can be explored and 
manipulated.  This is the process described by Oatley 
(2011) as miniaturization, or shrinking events, and objects 
to a manageable size. Toy soldiers, dolls, miniature castles, 
stuffed animals, and war games involving only a few 
children are all manifestations of this type of miniaturiza-
tion.
Oatley (2011) connects this notion of childhood play 
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the narrative progresses (described as plotting – Holland, 
1975, or replotting in Gerrig, 1993).  In this way, we sharp-
en our own knowledge of humans while learning about 
situations we may have never experienced (e.g., becoming 
a parent), or could never experience (e.g., being born of 
a different race or ethnic background) in the real world. 
Without narrative, told interpersonally or through media, 
all we know of the world is what we have experienced 
directly.
Radvansky (2008) has shown that, as we read or watch 
a narrative, the situation model that develops has a num-
ber of components that contribute to our comprehension 
and memory for story events.  The first of these is the 
overall situation model – a memory representation of the 
situation described in a narrative.  Research has shown 
that the situation model memory is separate from mem-
ory of the narrative itself (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Zwaan 
& Radvansky, 1998).  The situation model is embedded 
within a spatial-temporal framework that provides the 
context for defining any particular part of the narrative 
(Radvansky & Zacks, 1991).  Radvansky suggests that 
within this spatial-temporal framework are specific tokens 
that stand for the entities in a story:  people, objects, 
concepts, etc.  Each of these tokens has external and in-
ternal properties (e.g., physical properties, such as size 
and hair color, or mental properties, such as emotions, 
motivations, etc.).
Another component within this situation model or 
simulation is the relation between the tokens as they relate 
to the narrative.  These include such things as ownership, 
social connections, spatial proximity, and so forth.  Rad-
vansky (2008) suggests that the probability that any par-
ticular token or relationship is included in the model will 
be a function of the degree to which it will be involved in 
an interaction among the elements.  The tokens involved 
in one character taking car keys from a dresser might not 
be important if the person is going to simply drive a car 
to a destination, and the destination is more relevant to 
the story. The same act, if the person taking the car keys 
should not be driving due to alcohol consumption or 
other reasons, may be critical to the story.  The token 
representing that action may be nearly inactive in the 
former, while in the latter scenario, the token might take 
the center stage of the model, in anticipation of what 
might happen next.
The final component in this version of the situation 
have.
Situation Models
Cressey (1938) described our mental imaginings as 
neither wholly social nor wholly nonsocial; instead, he 
said they are extrasocial.  Cressey thought we worked out 
various social worlds and imagined ourselves in those 
worlds.  The sophisticated research techniques available 
to us today have made it evident that the imaginative 
worlds we learned how to construct in childhood are 
constructed with virtually all narratives (Graesser, Bow-
ers, Olde, & Pomeroy, 1999; Magliano, Taylor, & Kim, 
2005; Noh & Stine-Morrow, 2009; Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998; Zwaan, 2004).  These worlds are much more complex 
than researchers would have imagined only a few years 
ago.
We have used the term situation model to describe 
these worlds, although a number of similar terms have 
been used, such as simulations and imagined worlds. 
Some researchers include situation models and character 
models as two different components (cf., Bilandzic & 
Busselle, 2011), and many other models of content and 
process have been proposed, including constructionist 
theory (Graesser, et al. 1994); event-indexing (Zwaan, 
Langston, & Graesser, 1995), landscape model (van den 
Broek, Bohn-Gettler, Kendeou, Carlson, & White, 2011); 
or the resonance model (Albrecht, et al., 1995).  For most 
researchers, the situation model encompasses all the 
components of the story, including characters, situations, 
events, objects, settings, as well as those components 
which we must bring into the story from the real world 
so that the story makes sense (physical reality such as 
gravity, historical knowledge of people and events, etc.) 
(Graesser, et al., 1999). 
In situation models, words, actions, ideas, sounds and 
images are all brought together to enable us to experience 
a narrative for ourselves.  We construct these situation 
models as we process the information, so that we feel the 
experience much as we engage with the real world (Zwaan 
& Radvansky, 1998).  In simulating the narrative world, 
we rely on the information we have developed about 
people and how they behave.  Our simulation enables us 
to make predictions about past and future narrative events, 
and these predictions are either confirmed or denied as 
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tion of the situation model (e.g., transportation, f low, 
comprehension) rather than the particular components 
of the model.  The models and details presented in this 
section focus instead on tokens of the narrative and the 
linking relations between the tokens.
Continuous Updating
As we construct situation models of narratives, por-
tions of the information from the narrative is available in 
short-term memory (Mareno-Rios, Rodriguez-Menchen, 
& Rodriguez-Gualda, 2011; Oatley, 2011; Rapp & Kend-
eou, 2009; Reidl & young, 2010; Weingartner & Klin, 
2005, 2009).  However, these details need to be updated 
after an event or change in a situation, character, time or 
location (Brunyé, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2010; Gerrig, Bren-
nan, & Ohaeri, 2001). Because we have a limited capac-
ity short-term memory, our thoughts and ideas must be 
taken out of short-term memory to make room for new 
information when the narrative focus changes,.  Situation 
models appear to be constructed as a kind of bridge be-
tween short-term and other types of memory. That is, as 
the situation model is updated with new information, 
short term memory holds the new information while long 
term memory is accessed and alternative models are 
constructed. Each of these versions must be placed in 
long-term memory so that it is accessible as events change. 
Short term memory provides for the maintenance of re-
trieval cues for the models in long-term memory. The 
long-term memory model is relatively stable, while the 
short-term memory is much more volatile (Ericsson & 
Kintsch, 1995; Flanagan, 2008; Schneider & Dixon, 2009).
The situation model itself provides the gist of the situ-
ation (Radvansky & Curiel, 1998).  As we read or listen 
to a narrative, we process words or actions and the prop-
ositions (or meaning) that connects the words/actions. 
The situation model enables us to ignore the exact words 
that are used in favor of retaining what is meant by the 
words.  In this way, we are better able to update situation 
models.  We lose the exact words that were said, but 
maintain fast access to the ideas that are being commu-
nicated within the narrative.
Thus, for example, if we read that “Mary gave a book 
to Sally,” then given a list of sentences and asked if we 
have read any of them before, we are more likely to think 
model is one of linking relations between spatial-tempo-
ral frameworks within a story.  These linking relations 
provide connections (usually causal) between different 
aspects of the tokens.  Radvansky (2008) and others have 
shown that memory for the situation model lasts much 
longer than memory of a text itself (Kintsch & Mross, 
1985; Radvansky, Zwaan, Curiel & Copeland, 2001).  One 
will remember that the keys were taken much longer than 
the sentence used to describe the character taking the 
keys.
Radvansky’s program of research has also demon-
strated, and the research provided an explanation for, 
what is called the fan effect which has long been observed 
in psychology. The fan effect is an increase in memory 
retrieval time (or errors in retrieval) due to increased as-
sociations with a concept.  If people memorize three 
sentences that indicate three different locations for an 
object (A ball is in the yard, A ball is on the roof, A ball 
is under the car, for example), it takes longer to verify that 
any one of the sentences was read before than if one sen-
tence had been used (e.g., A ball is in the yard).  This is 
because people are thought to develop three different 
situation models – one for each location, since the same 
object cannot be in 3 different locations.  However, if they 
are given three sentences in which the objects are all dif-
ferent, but the location is the same (e.g., A ball is under 
the car, A stick is under the car, a squirrel is under the 
car), the information is integrated into a single situation 
model, and no effect is observed on retrieval time or error 
rate when asked whether a sentence has been read before.
Radvansky (2008) goes on to show that people organize 
situation models around actual world knowledge (e.g., 
events in the world, social conventions, ownership, space 
and time).  For more elaborate narrative memory, Rad-
vansky and others (Zwaan, 1996) have shown that with 
situation models created during consumption of a narra-
tive, information about various tokens within the narra-
tive follow general rules for spatial-temporal location in 
the real world.  That is to say that we categorize and re-
member narrative objects in a way that ref lects how a 
protagonist would interact with it in the real world, sub-
ject to time, space, gravity, weight and mass (Radvansky, 
2008; Zwaan, 1996).
The situation model presented by Busselle and Bilan-
dzic (2009) is consistent with much of this research, but 
is focused on audience effects association with construc-
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interaction with the character as if the character is real. 
With plotting, there may be no thought that the on-screen 
character is real, but the audience members may be talk-
ing aloud as they work out the details or implications of 
the plot.
Social Components
Connecting narrative to social processes is unavoid-
able.  While a narrative might not include people, it will 
inevitably include some aspect that we understand to be 
a part of our social world.  If the narrative involves animals 
or even simple dots as characters, we will still ascribe 
motivations that are human to the characters.  As Oatley 
(2012) indicates, our mental simulations help us under-
stand physical and social rules, individual motivations 
and reasoning, and other factors that are highly dependent 
on the skills we have learned as social creatures.  Using 
different terms, Paul Cressey (1938, pg. 519) long ago 
described motion picture viewing in similar ways: instead 
of facilitating social interaction, the cinema serves chief-
ly to set up imaginative states.  In these, imaginative 
participation takes the place of social participation.
In other words, with narratives we simulate social 
experiences or interactions, rather than participate in 
them.  The accuracy of our simulations will depend on 
how well we understand the social conventions involved. 
We might, for example, read a science fiction story about 
a creature from another planet.  In that case, we simulate 
a world in which such an interaction is possible, and we 
also simulate the behavior of the humans and the creature, 
based on what we know of humans, and, likely, other 
stories of aliens interacting with us.  While our process-
ing of narratives will have many of the psychological 
characteristics of a true social interaction, it will not 
actually have the interaction, only a simulated interaction 
as a part of the larger simulation of that world.
The social connection between narrative and the real 
world cuts both ways.  Not only does our social knowledge 
enable us to make more sense of the narrative (Lynch & 
van den Broek, 2007), but there is evidence that, as we 
make sense of the narratives in our lives, we may be in-
creasing our empathy and understanding of people in the 
real world (Mar, Oatley, & Peterson, 2009).
we have read “Sally was given a book by Mary” before 
than we would if the sentence were “Mary gave a car to 
Sally,” even though the latter sentence is much closer in 
terms of the words being used.  The meaning is more 
similar in the first instance than in the second.
Having the meaning of the narrative in short term 
memory, rather than all the details of a narrative, allows 
us to update the situation model quickly and efficiently, 
without having to keep too many items in short term 
memory.  In fact, effective comprehension requires us to 
create these abstract representations of the narrative 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, Mar & Oatley, 2008).
Predictive Simulations
Gerrig (1993) describes something he refers to as 
anomalous replotting: actively thinking about what could 
have happened to change the outcome  (p.177).  Research, 
though, suggests that, in addition to thinking about how 
a narrative outcome could have been different – a retro-
spective assessment – we also actively make predictions 
and guesses as to future events, implications of actions, 
and other details within the context of processing the 
narrative (Lynch & van den Broek, 2007; Magliano, Di-
jkstra, & Zwaan, 1996; McDonald, Sarge, Collier, Lin, & 
Potocki, in press).  In that sense, prediction further indi-
cates how active our construction of the situation model 
may be.  
Because it is not necessarily retrospective, plotting 
might be a better descriptor of what happens when we 
hear, read or watch a narrative.  Plotting is a method of 
making a series of predictions about what will happen 
next, and allows the person who is reading the narrative 
to consider multiple implications, multiple outcomes, and 
many different pathways toward conclusion of a story.  It 
is likely that many of the emotions we experience, such 
as suspense or surprise, are a result of our expectations 
in contrast to narrative events.  While much of plotting 
is internal and mental, there has been anecdotal evidence 
of the effects of plotting for many years, with reports of 
people giving advice or talking directly to characters on 
television (Gantz, Wang, Paul & Potter, 2006; Kassing & 
Sanderson, 2009).  The notion of parasocial interaction 
is related to the idea of plotting, but in parasocial interac-
tion, the idea is that an audience member engages in an 
Narrative Research in Communication
123 2014 , 2 (1), 115-132
simulation.  A kitchen will likely include an oven in our 
simulation, for example, whether it is included in the 
narrative or not (Fecica & O’Neill, 2010; Zwaan, 1996; 
Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998).
Sundermeier, van den Broek, and Zwaan (2005), as an 
example, found that, not only are story objects and their 
locations included within the situation model, the causal 
structure, or even a presumed causal structure, inf lu-
ences the extent to which those objects were cognitively 
available to readers.  In a murder mystery, for example, 
a gun that is mentioned in the narrative will remain 
highly accessible in the situation model we develop; a 
description of what was eaten for breakfast by a character 
is likely to be relatively inaccessible after the breakfast is 
over.
A growing number of studies provide evidence that 
we embody the narrative situation.  In embodied cognition, 
high-level cognitive processes are grounded in bodily 
mechanisms of perception, action and affect (Barsalou, 
2008; Glenberg, Goldberg, & Zhu, 2011).  In essence, our 
understanding of what is being communicated requires 
us to activate our own experiences with the world (Fe-
cica & O’Neill, 2010).  The evidence is mounting to indi-
cate that, during the processing of a narrative, readers 
actually simulate perceptual, motor and affective content 
of narratives (Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & 
Taylor, 2009; Fecica & O’Neill, 2010; Glenberg, 2010; 
Speer, Reynolds, Swallow, & Zacks, 2009; Zwaan, 2004).
Fecica and O’Neill (2010) note that numerous neuro-
imaging and behavioral studies have provided evidence 
consistent with an embodied account of situation models. 
They cite evidence from 12 studies to suggest that when 
we read, hear about, or watch actions, brain regions as-
sociated with those actions are activated.  This includes 
running, walking, speech, object manipulation, naviga-
tion of spatial movements, and any of a host of activities. 
When a narrative situation changes to involve another 
action, the brain region involved in performing that action 
becomes activated (Fecica & O’Neill; Speer, et al., 2009). 
In other words, the evidence is mounting that, when read-
ing, listening to or watching narratives involving percep-
tual and motor movements, our minds quite literally 
simulate the events and actions described. 
Similar studies have shown a number of aspects of 
embodied reading of narratives.  Silent reading, for ex-
ample, ref lects the reader’s regional accent (Filik & Bar-
What We Do with a Narrative
If the research is correct that the situation models that 
are created when we hear, watch or read a narrative help 
us function in the real world, then there is a need for us, 
as humans, to construct accurate situation models.  The 
situation model is an individual construction that draws 
from, but differs from, the information in the narrative 
itself.
For each of us, the situation model is somewhat dif-
ferent, and largely dependent on various individual char-
acteristics, such as the degree of attention, our understand-
ing of the social system depicted in the narrative, the 
details that attracted our attention, etc.  While we re-
member some aspects of the exact text or plot, we also 
have to use our own knowledge to interpret the narrative 
in a meaningful way (Lynch & van den Broek, 2007; 
Zwaan, Graesser, & Magliano, 1995).
Much as we interact in the real world, our situation 
models need to be dynamic so that we can respond to 
changes among any of a number of actors or events, make 
corrections as different pieces of information are brought 
to light, and used to predict events ahead of time.
Embodied Situations
If we return to our definition of a narrative, we recall 
that it refers to actors and events occurring within a space 
or multiple spaces, connected through a causal spatio-
temporal sequencing.  If we consider a simple narrative 
within the context of that definition, we see that even 
simple narratives result in very complex situations.  Mul-
tiple actors are likely to be in a number of different loca-
tions at different points in time.  Evidence is accumulat-
ing that our situation model conforms to our expectations 
about real world physics, time and geography, such that 
these simulated worlds work very much like the real world 
(Brunyé, et al., 2010; Drumm & Klin, 2011; Klin & 
Drumm, 2010; Moreno-Rios, Rodriguez-Menchen, & 
Rodriguez-Gualda, 2011; Schneider & Dixon, 2009).  
Research has indicated that in addition to time, space, 
actors, sequencing and causality, adults keep track of 
psychological factors related to the actors.  In addition, 
we bring our knowledge of the real world into our simula-
tion such that everyday objects that are, or in real life 
would be, in the vicinity of the actors will be in our 
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provide strong support for the idea that even young chil-
dren are not only able to simulate a character’s movement, 
but do so consistently, and that these simulations follow 
the laws and expectations of real-world inf luences, includ-
ing psychological states, distances and modes of trans-
portation.
Cross-Modality Effects
These kinds of effects might be classified as within 
modality effects because they are related to the content 
of the narrative itself, and a function of the medium being 
used to communicate the narrative.  Other researchers 
have focused on cross-modality effects: what happens 
when a different communication modality is provided 
during the construction of a situation model.  So, for 
example, a printed narrative includes auditory informa-
tion, such as how to pronounce a word, or the screech of 
a locomotive.
An intriguing study by Schneider and Dixon (2009) 
focused on the speed with which readers were able to 
reinstate a simulation after a disruption.  They found that 
when images were provided as visuospatial cues related 
to the model (i.e., a printed narrative involving a commit-
tee meeting used a picture of an office as a related visual) 
the interruption effect was smaller than when visuospatial 
cues were unrelated to the model (i.e., that same narrative 
with a picture of a kitchen).
A piece by Brunyé, et al., (2010) found that when par-
ticipants read a narrative that involved walking they altered 
their reading speed to match a metronome that was au-
dible in the background.  When footsteps, rather than a 
metronome, were audible while reading a narrative, there 
was an effect on how large (in physical terms) the space 
within the  narrative would be.  The finding suggests that 
narratives are simulated, and cross-modality information 
can alter how fast we process those narratives.  More 
importantly, our memories of spatial aspects of the nar-
rative can be altered by cross-modality information we 
obtain while processing the narrative.
Embodied Characters
It is common to suggest that we become a character 
when we are heavily involved in a narrative (Cohen, 2001). 
Many times, there is an accompanying suggestion that 
ber, 2011).  The use of pronouns in stories results in read-
ers embodying the actor’s perspective when “you” or “I” 
is used, but an external perspective when “he” is used 
(Brunyé, et al., 2009), and that readers actually simulate 
the sounds of auditory images, such as engines clattering 
when reading about the engines (Brunyé, et. al, 2009).  
Reaction time studies also support the view of an 
embodied situation model and indicate that the narrative 
actions and events prime those actions for us.  Zwaan and 
colleagues (Zwaan, et al., 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 
1998;  Zwarun & Hall, 2012), for example, have shown 
that we recognize pictures similar to events described in 
narratives faster than we recognize pictures that are in-
consistent with a narrative we have read.  Glenberg & 
Kaschak (2002) show that we are faster at making move-
ments that are consistent with a narrative we have just 
read than we are when the movements are inconsistent 
with those narratives.
Even more intriguing, readers apparently simulate the 
length of time required for events in a story.  Fecica and 
O’Neill (2010) report a study by Matlock that found that 
readers took longer to read the sentence “Road 49 cross-
es the desert” when they had been told that the desert is 
400 miles in diameter than they did when they had been 
told that the desert was 30 miles across.  These findings 
appear to be a result of the simulation, not of issues in 
reading interference or other extraneous results.  In their 
own study, Fecica and O’Neill found that even pre-liter-
ate children (3-5 years old) simulate a character’s move-
ment while listening to a story, and that real-world knowl-
edge and expectations of the duration of locomotion 
(walking and driving) inf luence the processing time re-
quired to comprehend the story.  
Additionally, Fecica and O’Neill (2010) found that the 
motivating factors of narrative characters (e.g., eagerness 
or dread of completing an action) inf luenced the simula-
tion of the character’s actions.  This was true even when 
their own attitudes toward the event ran counter to those 
of the character.  In other words, children’s processing 
time is consistent with a described character’s perspective, 
not their own perspective.  Still more interesting, char-
acter perspective effects in their study were only evident 
when the character’s movement was under that character’s 
control (i.e., walking), and not when the character was 
being driven by a parent (i.e., the character was in a car). 
Taken together, the Fecica and O’Neill (2010) results 
Narrative Research in Communication
125 2014 , 2 (1), 115-132
tagonist’s perspective, a finding which they saw as coun-
ter to causal reasoning models of goal adoption.  Going 
further, they found that, if asked to view the situation 
from the perspective of the protagonist, the readers only 
adopted the protagonist’s goals when the goals had not 
yet been satisfied.  It appears that goal contagion occurs 
quite readily.  However, when a reader adopts the perspec-
tive of a character, a character’s goals and whether they 
have been achieved from the perspective of the character 
become salient factors (Albrecht, et al., 1995).
Aarts, Gollwitzer and Hassin (2004) found support 
for goal contagion but similarly conclude that it is not an 
automatic process.  While mimicry or embodiment may 
not be under our conscious direction, adopting characters’ 
goals appears to be:  they are not adopted when the ob-
served character’s goal is conducted in a manner that is 
unacceptable, or if the attainment of the goal will be seen 
as unattractive to the audience member.   
Most narratives are complex interweaving of multiple 
events and multiple characters having differing goals. 
Magliano, et al., 2005) examine what happens when goals 
collide in the form of different goals for different charac-
ters.  They find even more evidence that our adoption of 
goals is under our control.  While we can adopt the goals 
of characters, it is probably more accurate to say that we 
monitor the goals of characters in terms of what those 
goals are and the extent to which they are completed. 
Magliano, et al., (2005) find that we monitor multiple 
characters’ goals, but that we monitor the most prominent 
characters’ goals to a greater extent than we monitor the 
goals of lesser characters.
Implications of Narrative Research 
for Communication Research
As a field, we are often thinking ahead of our capac-
ity to test the ideas we may have.  As other fields have 
developed methods and techniques to test some of the 
ideas that are similar to those our field has held for many 
years, we may see some cross-fertilization and a resultant 
clarification, of some of our basic concepts.  Identifica-
tion, for example, has been prominent in our field, at least 
since the Payne Fund Studies of the 1930s.  Unfortu-
nately, though, the conceptualization and measurement 
of identification has often been devoid of the narrative 
we have lost ourself in the story (Green and Brock, 2000). 
Current research is suggesting that, while we never lose 
our self in the story – we are always conscious of who we 
are and what we are doing – in a sense, we become all of 
the characters in a narrative.
Thinking broadly, the literature is suggesting that, the 
perspective taking we do while engaged in a narrative 
does improve our understanding of the story, but it also 
moderates whether the audience feels the emotional re-
sponse the character would feel (Mano, Harada, Sugiura, 
Saito, & Sadato, 2009).  Our mind simulates the action 
of an actor – any actor we see, read about or hear about 
(Klin & Drumm, 2010; Magliano, et al., 2005; Albrecht, 
et al., 1995; Frisson & Wakefield, 2012; Weingartner & 
Klin, 2009; Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, & Taylor, 2012). 
If that is the case, all of the actions of all of the characters 
become part of the situation model (Fecica & O’Neill, 
2010; Sereno, O’Donnell, & Sereno, 2009); we cannot 
stop that process.  Thus, in some ways, we take the per-
spective of, not just our favorite character, but our least 
liked character, and minor characters in between.  We 
mentally perform the behaviors they perform, and coor-
dinate that performance with the real world details that 
we believe will apply to the situation.  The embodiment 
of character actions leads to a perspective taking that is 
unavoidable (Brunyé, et al., 2010). 
Character Goals
If narrative understanding involves comprehension 
and connections between the events described in a nar-
rative, then another question arises as to how character 
actions relate to character goals and motivations, and 
how audience members understand those goals (Maglia-
no, et al., 2005; Morra & Guðbjörnsdóttir, 2009; Morrow, 
Greenspan & Bower, 1987; Oatley, 2011; Riedl & young, 
2010).
If we become the character in terms of movements, 
gestures, and behaviors, whether they are hero, villain, 
or subsidiary characters, a question that follows is wheth-
er we also take on the goals and motivations of the char-
acters in a process known as goal contagion.  Albrecht, et 
al., (1995) find that readers do adopt the goals of a nar-
rative character, when they are told what those goals are. 
In their study, participants adopted the goals of a char-
acter even if the goal had been satisfied from the pro-
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counter-arguing takes the form of advice, of disagreement 
with a character’s actions on moral or ethical grounds, 
or other issues? Certainly not rejection of a narrative - 
more likely there is a deep involvement of some kind.  The 
types of ‘participatory responses’ that Gerrig (1993) de-
scribes are not parasocial interaction, and certainly do 
not fit with traditional views of identification.  People 
often counter-argue because they are involved in a nar-
rative.  While as a field we have not been very specific 
about the antecedents of identification, transportation or 
narrative absorption, the literature we have described 
points at some intriguing possibilities that need further 
investigation.
Similarly, while Busselle and  Bilandzic (2011), and a 
number of other researchers see identification and per-
spective-taking as equivalent concepts, the narrative lit-
erature outlined above is suggesting something else.  Per-
spective taking is inf luenced by the nature and type of 
character goals and motivations, as well as real-world 
(physical) constraints on the action and physical aspects 
of the audience member  (Brunyé, et al., 2009; Filik & 
Barber, 2011; Speer, et al., 2009; Zwaan, 2004).  The lit-
erature in communication does not suggest any such 
limitations.  
The notion of multiple characters does typically not 
even enter the discussion on identification.  Narrative 
research, though, has taken note of the fact that there is 
nearly always more than one character, and that these 
other characters are monitored fairly closely.  Such infor-
mation has important implications for the social impacts 
of narratives, our learning about social interactions in 
the real world, and still more information of concern for 
real-world campaigns.  
Very little research in communication has even al-
luded to character goals, yet the literature suggests that 
character goals may predict perspective-taking.  Maglia-
no, et al. (2005) provide a starting point for such research. 
Their method (event partonomy), as well as their results, 
provides an intriguing possibility for our field.  In this 
case, participants segment activities into discrete actions, 
and indicate when actions change.  They found that, when 
focusing on a narrative, participants make situation change 
judgments that were consistent with monitoring the goals 
of multiple characters, so that the situation changes with 
character goal status.  
The notion of embodied cognition – that our minds 
context.  Narrative research has begun to clarify what 
happens in the interaction between character and audi-
ence member.
There has always been confusion as to whether we 
become the character or we enter the story world.  In the 
former version, we are the character, and so lose ourselves 
as we interact with others and perform actions in the 
story world.  In the latter version, we remain ourselves, 
but we act and react to events or actions, sometimes agree-
ing, sometimes disagreeing with what the character does. 
In the former instance, we have little choice in our actions 
and reactions, while in the latter, we are able to think 
about and choose alternative courses of action, regret 
choices made by the character, or warn “I told you so.”  
The difference lies in what we, as audience members, 
bring to the narrative context.  Do we keep our attitudes, 
stereotypes, prejudices, and knowledge of the world that 
we have experienced, or do we adopt those characteristics 
that we know are what the character thinks, feels or be-
lieves?  The picture that is emerging from psychological 
research is that the former explanation is more likely.  We 
retain our ability to step out of the action and back into 
it at any time (Rapp & Kendeou, 2009), we only adopt 
the goals of the characters to the extent that our real selves 
see those goals as appropriate within the narrative situ-
ation (Magliano, et al., 1996; Magliano, et al., 2005), and 
we therefore have an experience of being in the story 
world, but still apart from it (Gerrig, 1993).
That change alone provides a great deal of explanation 
as to why we might see counter-arguing occurring in a 
narrative.  If the protagonist’s goals are not complemen-
tary to the audience members, thoughts that accompany 
the processing are likely to follow a counter-narrative: I 
wouldn’t do that if I were her.  The notion of transportation 
or narrative absorption comes into play in this sense because 
identification often focuses attention on the idea that 
what we refer to as transportation.  The research suggests 
two important questions that have not been addressed: 
can one be absorbed (transported) in a narrative without 
identification?  Can we be absorbed without having com-
patibility between characters, goals and context?  It is 
clear that the greater the compatibility between context, 
character, goals and our own beliefs and attitudes, the 
less counter-arguing we should see, and some types of 
counter-arguing clearly ref lect a rejection of the narrative. 
What does counter-arguing a narrative suggest when that 
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It is tempting to think of narrative structure as some-
thing along the lines of formal features (e.g., cuts, pacing, 
fades, scene changes, etc.), which are easily measured 
with video, audio or textual material.  However, while 
these may be devices used within a specific kind of nar-
rative structure, it is important for us to realize that a 
narrative structure is a very complicated concept.  A 
change in the narrative structure may result in a change 
in the interpretation of the story.  So, for example, the 
choice between a cut or fade may help in communicating 
a director’s intention, but will the interpretation of the 
story remain the same?  It will likely depend on certain 
aspects of the larger narrative structure, but these effects 
are virtually unstudied in mainstream communication 
research.
Taken as a whole, the inquiry into narrative has led to 
some interesting, even exciting findings about this par-
ticular aspect of communication.  Some of these develop-
ments f ly in the face of traditional assumptions about how 
communication works.  Our field has been slow to incor-
porate these new ideas – possibly because of inertia, pos-
sibly because of a need to reexamine older ideas or con-
ventional methods.  Whatever the reason for the delay, 
research into communication and narrative has the po-
tential to transform the field of communication.  Let us 
hope it is welcome.
mimic the movements of characters in a narrative, and 
cannot really stop ourselves from doing so – has important 
implications for video game and violent media research. 
While a great deal of attention has focused on the idea 
that video games provide rehearsal for violent actions, 
the narrative research suggests that reading a story, watch-
ing a film or even listening to a story on radio also has 
such effects.  It will be important to document not just 
that violent games have different effects than these other 
media, but also to explain why.  Narrative research offers 
us that opportunity.
Another concern that has not really been addressed 
well in research on communication is the distinction 
between narrative and story.  While for many purposes, 
we are talking about the same thing when we refer to a 
narrative and a story, when we do research, it becomes 
clear that certain research procedures change narratives, 
while others change stories.  Experimental procedures, 
for example, might present a story in two different ways 
(e.g., one chronological version and one in reversed chro-
nology), making two narratives.  Other studies might 
present two different stories (e.g., one version where a 
character dies, one version where a character lives).  The 
implications are important for our understanding of pro-
cessing and reactions to stories and narratives, but if we 
never make the distinction, we will never understand the 
difference.
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